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Introduction: A Woman’s Home, A Man’s Castle

In the United States, the image of the ideal American family has seen
reinforcement in the mass media on a steady, on-going basis during the latter
half of the twentieth century. Although the phrase “a man’s home is his castle” Is
rarely heard In contemporary America, the patriarchal ideology from whence it
came has scarcely disappeared. At a time when politicians loudly proclaim the
urgent need for “family values” as a means of restoring the nation’s domestic
tranquillity, the ancient Biblical injunction to “respect, honor and obey” one’s
spouse seems to constitute the underlying basis for the concept of a “new”
contemporary moral compass. Republicans and Democrats alike gain political
capital by advancing the notion that, if only the present-day American family
possessed the requisite moral values, the nation’s moral fiber would not be so
badly frayed and there would be no need for governmental Intrusion into the
privacy of a man’s “castle.” As the prominent feminist social historian Del Martin
writes, the American family home ideally provides “refuge from the stormy
turbulence of the outside world.”^
Ideally, then, the American family home represents a sort of shelter from
the cold, cruel world, a place where family members can relax and enjoy the
relative comfort and safety of life after a difficult, demanding day of tension and
stress in the hectic public sphere. Unfortunately, as is so often the case, the
prevailing image belies the reality, creating a false facade which seems to
surround the American family. Rather than representing a social safeguard, the
door to the American household sometimes constitutes a metaphorical prison
cell door. In her critique of the Great American Family, Del Martin explains that
“the door behind which the battered wife is trapped is the door to the family
home.”^
Radical feminist literature often addresses the issue of violence against
women by asserting that the family Itself constitutes a potential form of physical
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and emotional harm to American women. To phrase it another way, the man’s
“castle” sometimes becomes the woman’s nightmare. Wife battery, according to
the prominent redical feminist Kathleen Barry, illustrates how the family
sometimes “institutionalizes male power and authority” by keeping the abuse of
women “in the home, private, and therefore, inaccessible to scrutiny.”’
Socialist feminist theorist Sheila Rowbotham concurs with Barry’s
perspective, adding that wife beating stems from the socially constructed duality
of the American home. Rowbotham views the family as a social dualism,
representing a much-needed “sanctuary” on the one hand, and a potential scene
of “thrashing, battery, [and] remorseless violence” on the other.'* When the
requisite American socio-economic values are adhered to, Rowbotham claims,
the capitalist sexual division of labor” relegates child care to women and often
allows men to shirk any childrearing responsibilities whatsoever. "If care were
truly social,” Rowbotham states, “there would be no need for defensive homes
as castles.”’
Care, compassion, and nurturance constitute important values which have
been traditionally ascribed to women. Yet the concept of social androgyny
entails the notion that people of either gender can (and should) possess similar
positive character traits. Feminism rejects the devaluation of American women
which so often results from patriarchal male standards, and it emphasizes the
crucial role women have traditionally played in maintaining the cohesiveness of
the American family. As family therapist Ron Thorne-Finch writes, feminists
maintain that by “cooking, cleaning, and nurturing, women through the ages
have played the important role of keeping families together,” and therefore these
activities “should not be devalued simply because they have been of little
interest to men.”' Feminists have radically enlarged the contemporary scope of
womanhood by recognizing that society has allowed men to exploit women by
characterizing the importance of passivity, dependence, and deference as if they
were an integral part of women’s “true" nature. As Thorne-Finch explains,
feminists have met with some degree of success in fostering a healthy self
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image among women by encouraging them to be “independent, self-reliant, and
assertive.”^
Traditional notions of masculinity entail the view that the public
marketplace constitutes a man’s “appropriate” sphere, and so men have
traditionally expected their wives to operate within the separate sphere of private
domestic life with all its daily drudgery. The public / private dichotomy,
according to feminist legal theorist Elizabeth Schneider, has often been viewed
as "an important construct for understanding gender.”® Paradoxically, however,
although men have traditionally led a public life in the realm of the market
economy, the previously mentioned concept that “a man's home is his castle”
has also held sway, and so women have been kept virtually absent from the
public sphere while being subordinated and oppressed in men’s “private
castles.” As Schneider argues, the “notion of marital privacy has been a source
of oppression to battered women and has helped to maintain women’s
subordination within the family. However, a more affirmative concept of privacy
may be developed.”®
Given the fact that privacy as it is currently conceptualized actually
promotes violence against women within the home, part of the task of feminist
theory today entails a deconstruction of male-defined notions of privacy as the
antithesis of the public realm, the central premise of the traditional “either / or “
dichotomy which arbitrarily (and falsely) places every event and every lived
experience within a socially constructed binary system of logic. Schneider
argues that privacy as it is presently defined “encourages, reinforces, and
supports violence against women, [because] privacy says that violence against
women Is Immune from sanction, that it is permitted, acceptable and part of the
basic fabric of American family llfe.”^° Patriarchal American society overtly
focuses on women-as-victims in a manner which “perpetuates the power of
patriarchy” by not only failing to scrutinize the batterer and his motives, but by
actually allowing him to effectively deny his role as the batterer and thereby
maintain a degree of male privilege and domination.
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Male dominance and corresponding images of battered women as the
survivors of an unconscionable, immoral and unjust series of severely harmful
actions carry a clearly delineated message which speaks to the power of
heterosexuality as an overwhelming source of oppression. As feminist Carol
Gilligan has written, a case can be made that “stereotypes of males as
aggressive and females as nurturant, however distorting and however limited,
have some empirical claim.” ^ The validity of such gender*based images,
according to Gilligan, are overtly reflected In the “overwhelmingly male
composition of the prison population and the extent to which women take care of
young children,” two straightforward examples of the aforementioned
stereotypes.^^
As feminist activist Michele Bograd has articulated, although there is “no
unified feminist perspective on wife abuse,” all feminist researchers seek to
answer the question ‘Why do men beat their wives?’ by analyzing the general
nature of heterosexual relationships in society while refusing to accept the
widely-held notion that male violence against women constitutes a set of
“random. Irrational acts.”^^ Feminists view wife abuse as a pattern of social
control which becomes understandable “only through examination of the social
context” within which the pattern remains pervasive. The cultural ideal of the
American family home as a “peaceful haven in a heartless world” does not
obtain, from a feminist perspective; rather, as Bograd explains, feminist theory
effectively draws “empirical links between the personal and the political,” thereby
leading to the conclusion that “wife abuse is not a private matter but a social
one.”^®
The Influence of feminists who have worked to ameliorate the pervasive
plight of battered women In contemporary society has constituted a crucial
component of the recent transformation of public perceptions regarding the issue
of violence against women. In some respects, a "public dimension" of the
problem has been added, largely due to the efforts of feminist public activists
who have worked directly with battered women, and who also have been vocal in
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demanding gender justice in the nation's court system. As Schneider observes,
the efforts of political activists has resulted in "a recognition by governmental
bodies, speaking with a public voice, that they must acknowledge and deal with
the problem...As work on battered women has evolved, social meanings of what
is private and public, and the relationship between them, have become more
complex."

Hence, a new and more complicated “zone” between the

overlapping “public” and “private” spheres of society has combined with a
heightened social consciousness among Americans, the vast majority of whom
deplore family violence, to create a much-needed “public dimension” to the
issue.
Evidence of the developing awareness among “mainstream” society of the
public dimension of the problem of battered women includes an expanded range
of available legal remedies and a widespread Increase In statutes specifically
designed to deal directly with the problem.

Civil remedies such as restraining

orders, protective orders, and “no-contact” orders provide women with a means
of legally enjoining men not only from beating them, but also from coming to their
homes, or even telephoning them. Also, criminal statutes presently exist which
result In the arrest of batterers who either beat a woman, or who break the law
by violating a restraining order.

Perhaps the best evidence of the important

new public dimension of violence against women as a social and political Issue
can be seen in the fairly wide number of court decisions handed down on the
matter in recent years. Including decisions rendered as the result of batterers
striving to cloak themselves behind the Bill of Rights and its implicit “right to
privacy” in order to escape prosecution on charges of battery and sexual
assault.^®
The outcomes of several court cases provide a degree of hope for a
crucial transformation of the legal system from a strictly adversarial system to a
"kinder, gentler" sort of judiciary, one whose present-day focus on the plight of
battered wives has largely stemmed from an increase in feminist activism on the
Issue, coupled with the entrance of a number of influential feminist attorneys into
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the nation's legal arena. Ironically, the decisions which resulted from a male
plaintiff suing for his civil liberties after he had been either charged or convicted
of battery or sexual assault have actually led to positive results for women.’ In
the case of Commonwealth v. Shoemaker, 359 Pa. Super. 111, 528 A.2d 591
(1986), an appellate court set an important precedent by rejecting a male
defendant's "privacy challenge" in concluding that, because all individuals
possess a 'fundamental right to control the integrity of [their] own bod[ies],'' any
alleged "right" to privately rape one's spouse must be overridden by the state's
compelling interest in protecting the personal freedom of individuals to maintain
the integrity of their own bodies in an unimpaired condition.” Other related
cases involving male-initiated “privacy challenges" to criminal convictions for
battering women have led to even stricter interpretations of the law, including the
important position that "marital privacy was never intended to cover
nonconsensual acts."^’ Significantly, an important judicial analogy has been
established in a case where the court held that "just as a husband cannot invoke
a right to marital privacy to escape liability for beating his wife, he cannot
justifiably rape his wife under the guise of a right to privacy."”
The "public dimension" of the problem of battered women in America does
not entail a meaningful decrease in its occurrence, however. As Schneider
points out. there exist "serious problems in the enforcement and implementation"
of the current legal remedies available to battered women."” In an influential
essay, the popular radical feminist Andrea Dworkin has publicly and honestly set
forth the tragic consequences of the fact that, in far too many cases, the
available system of legal sanctions against violence against women does not
deter a batterer from physically and emotionally attacking the woman who
sought legal protection from him. In her "Letter from a War Zone," Dworkin
effectively explicates the on-going violent atrocities being committed against
" "“^“81 assault,- and "rape" cannot be said to be orecise
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women, explaining that in the United States, a 'Nvoman is beaten every eighteen
seconds: by her husband or the man she lives with, not by a psychotic stranger
in an alley.

The seriousness of contemporary violence against women has actually
reached crisis proportions in America, a fact which ought to mobilize sociaily
concerned citizens to unite against the injustice. Although most Americans are
probably ill-informed with regard to the prevalence of the problem, the fact that
feminists have enabled the issue to become a subject of discourse within the
public domain provides a potential starting-point from which meaningful social
change can occur. The facts as they stand entail an obvious need for prioritizing
the issue, among the dominant society as well as among feminist activists.
Woman beating, the intimate kind, is the most commonly committed violent
crime in the country," writes Dworkin. To make matters worse, a woman is raped
every three minutes in the United States, and over forty percent of adult women
in America have been raped at least once.”
The general perception among most Americans holds that, not long ago,
there existed a time when most families were happy and homogenous, albeit
anxious, living as they were under the perceived threat of nuclear annihilation at
the hands of the Soviet Union. The 1950s inform contemporary American
politics via the model of the Great American Family, a socially constructed ideal
utopian nuclear family which adhered to "traditional" values in a world of relative
innocence. In retrospect, one can readily understand the nostalgia for a return
to the bygone era when, in the words of social historian Stephanie Coontz,
"Gang warfare among youths did not lead to drive-by shootings, the crack
epidemic had not hit yet; discipline problems in the schools were minor; [and]
no 'secular humanist' movement opposed the 1954 addition of the words 'under
God' to the Pledge of Allegiance."” The tactics in use today among many
politicians seeking public office through the use of the New Right rhetoric of
“family values" reinforce the widespread notion that the 1950s represent the
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nation s good old days,” “good" because American households seemed to live
in a state of relative bliss and harmony.
Yet, the so-called “traditional” family of the 1950s had no actual precedent
In the nation s history, and thus constituted a “qualitatively new phenomenon “
whose public image belied its private reality. As Coontz explains in her mythshattering book The Way We Never Were , the reality of the American family of
the 1950s was “far more painful and complex than situation comedy reruns or
the expurgated memories of the nostalgic would suggest. Contrary to popular
opinion, ‘Leave it to Beaver’ was not a documentary.’"^^
As Coontz points out, behind the polished facade of the Great American
Family of the fifties existed “violence, terror, or simply grinding misery that only
occasionally came to light.” Family violence occurred on a regular, on-going
basis, but the family “ideal” to which Americans look today with great nostalgia
was maintained as the result of a conscious and deliberate pattern of
concealment of domestic strife and marital disharmony which helped serve the
nation’s defense interests in the early years of the Cold War. According to
Coontz, the nation’s foremost journal of American family sociology “did not carry
a single article on family violence between 1939 and 1969,” and wife battering
was not even viewed as a “real crime” by most Americans in the fifties.^® The
legendary family of the 1950s actually represented a source of blatant
oppression for many housewives; when women were beaten, according to
historian Elizabeth Fleck, psychiatrists often regarded the battered woman as a
masochist who provoked her husband Into beating her.”®°
Such scurrilous pronouncements by experts from within the medical
profession served to foster male dominance over women at a time when the
hedges and driveways of suburbia effectively concealed “tragedies of madness,
suicide, and—most prevalent of all-—chronic and severe alcoholism.”®^ Mothers
and their offspring played a critical role in furthering the false facade by “keeping
up appearances,” having been pressed by the dominant American capitalist
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patriarchy into serving as “happy smiling fronts, emissaries of family normalcy,
cheerful proof that ‘nothing was really wrong’ at the Joneses.”^^
Something really was wrong, however; although the myth of the
traditional family of the fifties constitutes an important political tool by which
present-day politicians convince people to vote for them, a return to the fifties
does not entail a return to “normalcy.” The prevalence of the psychological
approach to addressing family strife served to help maintain male patriarchal
power over women. As Pleck argues, many women who were either physically
or sexually assaulted by their husbands understandably tended to refuse their
husbands’ subsequent demands for sex, a fact which meant that women and not
men needed therapy (!) to “bring out their anxieties about sex activities.”"
Further, the psychiatric profession literally added Insult to Injury by declaring that
women were responsible for much of the familial discord which took place.
Including inter-family violence; as one prominent physician wrote In 1953
behind the “mask of placidity” and the “outwardly feminine appearance” of many
American housewives, there hid “an inwardly tense and emotionally unstable
individual seething with hidden aggressiveness and resentment.”"
Whether or not white middle-class housewives were “seething with anger
because they grew tired of being physically assaulted, emotionally abused, and
socially confined to their places within the home, the false representations of the
“traditional” fifties family will not suffice as a realistic Image for contemporary
American women to model themselves after, nor do they serve any real purpose
in the quest to ameliorate contemporary family violence in America. The fictive
image of the happy nuclear family in America does, however, provide evidence
to suggest that the cultural ideal of the American family home as a peaceful
haven in a heartless world belles the fundamental reality of women’s
subordination at the hands of the male batterer, and that feminists who assert
that wife abuse constitutes a social problem rather than a private matter are
correct In their assertion.
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Feminism integrates practice and theory. As Leslie Bender, Professor of
Law at Syracuse University, writes, although there exist “many feminisms, all
with distinctive priorities,” certain generalizations can be made with regard to the
ideology of feminist women as an aggregate.” Feminism, as Bender notes, is
“political, methodological, philosophical, and intent upon transformation."” The
prominent U.S. women's historian Linda Gordon provides a concise “working
definition” of feminism: “By feminism,” she writes, “I mean an analysis of
women s subordination for the purpose of figuring out how to change it.””
Social change from a feminist perspective entails not only exposing
patriarchy, but also seeking empowerment for women in the process. With
regard to the problem of battered women, feminism seeks to expose batterers
within a public socio-political framework which also exposes the tyranny of
patriarchy. The term “patriarchy” denotes a system which limits women's
opportunities for empowerment. The term's definition has gradually evolved
through the ages, to finally come to refer to a male-dominated system which
operates to exclude the vast majority of women and minority group members
from gaining full, equal access to the nation’s powerful social, political, and
economic institutions, where they could (at least in theory) receive a full and
equal share of the benefits of society. Although Webster’s Dictionary still
defines “patriarchy" to designate “a form of social organization in which the
father is the head of the family, clan, or tribe, and descent is reckoned in the
male line,” Bender provides a definition which implicates the primacy of
patriarchy in creating and maintaining the problem of violence against women.
“Patriarchy,” writes Bender, “is the feminist term for the ubiquitous phenomenon
of male domination and hierarchy, through which men have had the bulk of
power and have used that power to subordinate.”” As Bender explains, male
power manifests itself not only in the area of political economics, but it aiso
“governs families and sexual relationships,” in the process providing certain
temporary benefits to those it relegates to a marginalized social status, benefits
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which are “greatly outnumbered by the permanent and serious harm to
[women].

The egregious harm women incur when they are battered by men has led
some feminists, especially those of the “radical” school of thought, to intervene
on behalf of battered women. Radical feminist women have effectively used
their roles as counselors, therapists, educators, and students to make feminist
emotional counseling more relevant to the needs of all women, especially those
women who are interested in forms of therapeutic healing which allow them to
retain, or perhaps even to enhance, positive identities of themselves as women,
and as human beings. Radical feminism views violence against women as
“unnecessary and yet unavoidable, individual yet common, suffering born of the
patriarchy and other systemic oppression,” and offers a range of therapy which
utilizes consciousness-raising techniques to help women heal.*^
“Radical therapy” refers to individual counseling as well as the political
movement which grew In response to systemic male oppression, and It focuses
primarily on “the physical violation of Woman as Body.”^^ One of the more
“radical” aspects of radical feminist therapy involves its anti-psychiatric
perspective, an interesting viewpoint with regard to mainstream modern
medicine which holds that “psychiatry [constitutes] a fundamentally oppressive
Institution propped up by hegemony and built upon mystification, subordination,
and violence."^^ Psychiatry, in other words, comprises a form of patriarchal
oppression that harms women, at least in the view of most practitioners of radical
feminist therapy.
The operant premises of radical feminist counseling are based on radical
feminist Ideology, as well as the lived experiences of women within patriarchy.
There are four primary propositions of radical feminist therapy, and they
demonstrate the importance of radical feminist theory in shaping the ways In
which feminist activists work within the community. The first premise of radical
feminist therapy holds that “women are violently reduced to bodies that are-formen, and those bodies are then further violated.”^ Significantly, this premise
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parallels the language and political rhetoric of an important New York-based
“second wave” radical feminist group known as the Redstockings.'”
As historian Miriam Schneir has written, the women who formed the
radical Redstockings feminist organization in 1969 epitomize the values and
precepts of second wave feminism from within their place in the sixties women’s
movement. The Redstockings’ name represents a twist on the word
“bluestockings,” a derogatory term which has been applied to “brainy” women,
and the group was formed by two women with keen intellects, Shulamith
Firestone and Ellen Willis, during the genesis of the radical feminist movement
in America.

The group’s belief that male supremacy constitutes “the oldest,

most basic form of oppression of one human being by another forms the basis
for the celebrated “Redstockings Manifesto,” an interesting list of grievances
which demands that all men “give up their male privileges and support women’s
liberation in the interest of our humanity and their own.”'**
In light of the span of time between 1969, when the Redstockings
organized, and the recent advent of radical feminist therapy for battered women,
the similarities between the radical Redstockings Manifesto and the four operant
premises of radical feminist therapy seem to at least suggest that an ideological
continuity, consistent awoss time, comprises the core of radical feminism and
Illustrates its dedication to truth as a moral vehicle for understanding the ever
present problem of male supremacy and its insidious grip on women’s lives. The
Redstockings challenged the prevailing power structure by choosing the public
domain as a site of resistance, and they completely refused to accept society’s
prevalent sexist notions which entail a “public man / private woman” dichotomy.
Recalling the first premise of today’s feminist therapy for battered women,
that “women are reduced to bodies that are-for-men,” the Redstockings’ 1969
view that women’s oppression is “total, affecting every fact of our lives,” and that
women’s humanity is diminished because women’s “prescribed behavior is
enforced by the threat of male violence,” demonstrates a significant degree of
consistency and continuity in radical feminist thought during the past twenty or
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thirty years/^ The second operant premise of contemporary radical feminist
counseiing maintains that “violence is absolutely integral to our experience as
women.”" This premise constitutes an approximate equivaient of the notion that
“men have controlled all political, economic, and cultural institutions and backed
up this controi with physical force," a statement issued as part of the
Redstockings Manifesto which illustrates an interesting parailel between the two
documents, thus reinforcing their value as evidence of continuity and congruity
of radical feminist political thought during the past twenty-five years." Just as
the operant premises of contemporary radicai feminist therapy are written from
the perspective of women and their shared experience, the key tenets of radical
feminist theory (as embodied in the Redstockings Manifesto) are also the result
of women’s experiences as well.
Further parallels exist between the third and fourth operant premises of
present-day radical feminist therapy, and the key principles of the late sixties
“second wave” radical feminist movement. As set forth by Burstow, the third
premise states that “extreme violence is the context in which other violence
occurs and gives meaning to the other forms, with which It Inevitably interacts.”®®
In their manifesto, the Redstockings agreed with the idea that the context of
violence (or, “enforced submission”) characterizes Its reality, condemning the
idea that women consent to or are to blame for their own oppression” as If the
socially constructed category “woman” contained as part of Its essential nature
characteristics which render women as being somehow blameworthy, or even
complicit. In their own battering. “Women’s submission,” declared the
Redstockings, stems from “continual daily pressure from men” and is not the
result of stupidity or mental illness.”®^ Finally, the concluding premise of radical
feminist therapy which declares that “all women are subject to extreme violence
at some time or live with the threat of extreme violence” provides a point of
departure from which “women’s liberation” and radical feminist therapy can both
be seen as an obvious and flat-out refusal of women to see themselves as “the
problem.”®^ Through “consciousness-raising" therapy, radical feminists come to
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see their own humanity more clearly delineated in reality, rather than
represented solely on society's terms. “Women-as-objects” fails to obtain, other
than as a recognition that some human beings (women) are oppressed at the
hands of some men (batterers) who see them as sub-human, devalued “objects”
In a system where male power is “enforced by the threat of violence."®^
The notion that “a man’s home Is his castle” epitomizes the central claim
of batterers inasmuch as it entails the obvious possibility for violent
confrontations between batters and women. At the hands of male tyranny,
“women-as-people” do not exist, but Instead become obliterated by the batterer’s
woman-as-object” mindset. As Coontz has written, “pro-family” conservatives In
America today espouse the “Ideal family” as a unit which Includes “paternal
bread-winning, maternal domesticity, repression of female sexuality, and an
equation of family privacy with free enterprise, Americanism, and patriotism.”®^
This family pattern, according to Gordon, is “nof traditional, as is often claimed
today.”®® It also fails to obtain in today’s actual world of the late 1990s. Yet the
rhetoric of the “pro-family” right invariably strives to promote the image which
has, until recent years, been the guiding force for the ideal “paternal
breadwinner’ family image; today, although more Americans reject "the”
traditional family image in pursuit of their own Ideal, the notion that “a man’s
home Is his castle” still holds sway in the religious fundamentalist-oriented “profamily” political right.
The purpose of this essay will be essentially two-fold. For one. It seeks to
explore the Issue of battered women from a variety of perspectives In order to
generate meaningful dialogue with respect to the issue. Also, the essay’s author
hopes to provide the reader with a fuller understanding of the history and pofitics
behind the present-day phenomenon of battered women. By meeting these two
goals, the sole and overriding aim of the essay is to articulate at least a few
Ideas about what men can do to ameliorate the problem. The Redstockings
Manifesto argues, quite correctly, that women “do not need to change
themselves, but to change men.”®® To this It can be added that men need to

14

change fhemselves, partially by changing their notions of what it means to be a
man.
Feminism constitutes an important means by which women can become
empowered and by which society can become more democratic and less
patriarchal, both in practice as well as principle. Social justice demands more
than a strong and active feminist women’s involvement in the political process,
however. Unless men everywhere become politically conscious of the need for
meaningful and lasting social and political change, the problem of violence
against women will continue unabated because of men’s status in the patriarchal
social structure as a “forty-nine percent majority group," and because of a variety
of historical social and legal precedents which have always, at least until quite
recently, functioned as ways of “legitimizing” male violence and tyranny. History
and politics serve as disciplines through which the feminist notion “the personal
Is political” (and hence a part of the public domain) can help create an effective
conflation of “public / private” precepts which need re-definition. If this paper
helps re-define the aforementioned precepts and delineates a plausible set of
ideas with which to replace them, and which could help serve to create a kinder,
gentler America whose ethical characteristics would necessarily preclude and
prevent gender injustice, then it will have satisfied its author as having been a
worthwhile undertaking.

Why They Don’t (Have to) Leave
Before embarking on a journey into the social and legal history of wife
beating In America, and, to some extent, England, it will be necessary to explore
the present-day phenomenon of battered women from the perspective of
women’s responses to being battered. In attempting to appreciate the lived
experiences of battered women. It becomes important to analyze cases, legal or
otherwise, in which battered women responded in different ways to different
circumstances, such analysis is required to enhance one’s awareness of the
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variety of issues of gender justice in America and the ways in which the issues
are handled by men in power.
Upon examining certain important trials and their outcomes, the legal
system reveals itself as an evolving entity, especially when specifically
examining a court’s “rationale,” the legal reasoning behind its decision. For
example, feminist law professor Christine A. Littleton describes the case of Jo, a
twenty-three year old battered woman whose response to her circumstances was
to kill her batterer.®^
Jo was convicted at her trial for the crime of voluntary manstaughter after
the following set of facts occurred. Jo’s boyfriend David, who lived with her most
of the time, tried to initiate sex with her one night, and she requested that he
stop because she felt too fatigued. David instantly became angry and screamed
at Jo, then refused to allow her to leave by holding his clenched fist in her face.
When Jo sat down, David kicked her swiftly and directly in the back. Jo then
responded (rather creatively) by placing a hair pick between her back and
David s on-coming foot as he kicked her again. The temporary pain David
experienced caused him to grow even angrier, however, and he grabbed Jo by
the throat and choked her, and then finally hurled her against the bedroom
door.”
In response, Jo found her gun and then. In an absolute panic, ran
downstairs to place a phone call to her mother, only to discover that the phone
had been disconnected. Jo then tried to flee the premises, but David refused to
allow her to leave by slamming the door on her foot, at which time Jo retaliated
by firing three bullets directly at David with her eyes shut. Soon thereafter, Jo
ran to a neighbor s home and phoned the police. When they arrived, Jo was
arrested, tried, and finally convicted of the crime of manslaughter.®®
At her trial, Jo pled “not guilty” and claimed she had acted In self defense.
She took the stand and testified that David had beaten her regularly, always
telling her afterward that he would never do it again. The beatings became more
frequent, however, after Jo moved In with David; yet, Jo always said she
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believed David when he told her he would never do It again. She testified that
on the night she killed David he had threatened her and she was “scared he
would hurt her more than ever before, and that she shot [David] in fear of her
llfe.”®°
The Issues at stake in the case of Jo and David defy “black letter law” and
illustrate the problematic nature of murder-as-self-defense against a batterer. Jo
was not allowed the right to introduce expert testimony at her trial which would
have tended to exonerate her by explicating a controversial social phenomenon
known as “battered women’s syndrome.” Without hearing testimony pertaining
to the “syndrome,” the jury did not learn that women in the throes of battered
women’s syndrome “believe that their husbands are capable of killing them, that
there Is no escape, and that If they leave they will be found and hurt even
more.

The jury at Jo’s trial was not informed by an expert from the medical

profession that battered women themselves Invariably believe that they are in
some way blameworthy for their husband’s behavior, and they often also believe
that it Is Impossible to escape the batterer, a fact which Illustrates the extremely
tense atmosphere of a situation In which a battered woman believes she cannot
leave, and sometimes experiences such Intense fear that she becomes literally
immobilized.^ Yet the battered woman’s response in remaining at the scene
with the batterer is largely viewed as “Irrational” by the general public; indeed,
the thrust of Jo’s appeal of her verdict (guilty) centered on the question of
whether Jo’s belief (“no escape is possible”) was rational, or whether it
constituted an “aspect of women’s abnormal psychology."®^
Jo’s conviction was reversed on appeal by the Georgia State Supreme
Court, but even so the court’s decision was roundly criticized by advocates for
battered women due to its emphasis on the alleged “unreasonableness” of Jo’s
having remained at the scene of her battering(s). The state supreme court
reasoned that the “average layman” would be inclined to believe that the
“logical” reaction of a battered woman would be to “call the police or leave her
husband or boyfriend,” and thus the jury should have been allowed to hear
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testimony at Jo’s trial pertaining to the "battered women’s syndrome.Battered
women, as Littleton writes, are sometimes seen by the court as “alien,” their
reasoning and actions being incomprehensible to the average reasonable
person, the jury member who is actually asked to imagine what his response
would have been under the “same or similar circumstances.
According to Littleton’s account of Jo’s case, the appellate court’s holding
that battered women’s “reasoning and actions [are] beyond the ken of the
average layman” is plausible in light of the fact that “not only battered women,
but all women, may appear alien from a male perspective”(itals. added).®® The
notion that the battered woman’s “primary motivation is fear has been criticized
as being “largely irrelevant,” although in practice a woman who acts in selfdefense must actually convince the jury that she was afraid of the batterer in a
way which the jury members will understand, or else she will be imprisoned by
the state (instead of by the batterer).®" Finally, the “average layman" must also
be convinced that a battered woman who did not leave the scene because she
believed there was no avenue of escape was actually entitled to her belief
because it was “reasonable.”®® Only expert testimony, in the view of the court,
could rationalize the seeming “irrationality” of not leaving, so that the jury can
understand its rational basis.
The case of Jo cuts to the heart of the question which invariably (and
quite maddeningly) gets raised with regard to all battered women: “Why didn’t
she just leave?” As Littleton argues In her essay about Jo’s trial and conviction,
the consequences of whether or not the battered woman’s belief that “escape is
impossible” is seen as a rational belief for a battered woman to have, are
numerous and fundamentally interrelated.®® Paradoxically, Littleton argues, the
law’s focus on the personal, subjective nature of a woman’s belief that It would
be fruitless to flee a batterer, and its failure to credit the beliefs rational basis,
allows batterers to win at trial if they can show that the individual woman had not
yet been “battered enough” to use the “battered women’s syndrome.”^ Although
Jo was “battered enough” that the abrogation of her right to expert testimony
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about battered women’s syndrome served as "reversible error” at her trial, other
women have not been so fortunate; in a recent Idaho case, for instance, the
exclusion of expert testimony was upheld in a trial where “the defendant testified
as to only one prior occasion of physical abuse.”^'
Different battered women respond in different, contrasting ways to
different sets of circumstances. The question of whether it is “rational” for a
battered woman to believe she cannot, in any way, possibly hope to escape her
plight has managed to work its way to the forefront of aiminal matters and civil
litigation. As a general rule, people tend to view battered women as “deviant,
unusual, perhaps even rare,” a view which reinforces notions of male violence
as a “woman’s problem.” When the law focuses on women’s psychological
responses to battering, it actually becomes easier to blame the battered woman
herself for her failure to escape.” Thus the law operates to some extent to make
women seem culpable for their own battering. The law maintains an “absolute
focus” on whether the battered woman ’chose’ correctly between the risk of
leaving and the risk of staying, and “away from whether men should be able to
impose either sets of risk [on women],”” according to Littleton; as a result,
society and its iegal system never truly address the issue(s) which can be
deemed central to the problem of battered women in America: maie vioience,
maie power, and patriarchy.”
As Miami University Law Professor Martha R. Mahoney writes, the
“shopworn” question (why didn’t she ieave?) reveais certain implicit yet wideiybased assumptions about battered women, assumptions which many people
have held without much question or scrutiny. For battered women, the “right
solution” entaiis the separation of one’s self from one’s own home, if the oid
shop-worn question demands an answer. Implicit in the question is the notion
that it is the woman’s responsibility to leave, even though the man is the party-atfault, and that she could have left if she had reaiiy wanted to.” From this, some
anti-feminists (“misogynists”) have even claimed that the battered woman (by
society’s definition “irrational”) “rationally” chose to remain with the batterer, and
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so either the situation must not have been too greatly abhorrent, or the battered
woman carried a share of the guilt for her “role” In the battery: her failure to “just
leave.”
The ludicrous, wornout question (why didn’t she just leave?) altogether
ignores women s role as a peacemaker in the house, a childrearing homemaker,
a nurturant mother, and a supportive wife, all of which are important aspects of
women’s traditional domestic Identities. The complexity of a mother’s bond to
her children and / or her husband becomes trivialized by the question, as If the
family always functions quite well in her absence, when she “just leaves.” Of
course, the truth regarding wife-beating is that many women actually do leave,
but their departures tend to be short-lived due to their many responsibilities
within the family. As Mahoney writes, “When we ask the woman ‘Exactly what
did you do in your search for help?’ the answer often turns out to be that she
left—at least temporarily.”^®
Self-defense cases scarcely constitute the “norm" in battered women’s
lives, yet they are illustrative of the wide variety of responses to being battered,
responses which do not necessarily preclude taking the life of the batterer. Like
Littleton, Mahoney also explores the Importance of defining “self-defense” in
cases where a battered woman killed the batterer. In State v. Stewart 763 P.2d
572 (Kansas, 1985), the Kansas State Supreme Court handed down a ruling
pertaining to the question “Why didn’t she leave Instead?” In a case where a
woman killed her battering husband in self-defense while he was asleep.^
The facts in Stewart occurred as follows. Peggy and Mike Stewart
married In 1974, and Mike became a father to Carla and Laura, Peggy’s
daughters through her first marriage. As soon as Peggy and Mike became
newly-weds, Mike proceeded to abuse Peggy both physically and emotionally,
and Peggy entered psychiatric treatment for schizophrenia after she developed
emotional problems stemming from her abusive relationship with Mike. Not only
did Mike tamper with Peggy’s prescription drugs, thus forcing her to do without
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her medication, he also severely beat her daughter Carla. Finally, after Mike
told Peggy to “kill and bury Carla,” Peggy decided to file for divorce.^®
The Stewart court was divided, but Its oplnlon(s) concurrently chronicled
an “extraordinarily violent and abusive marriage" in which Peggy received death
threats directly and repeatedly from Mike. In one instance, Mike, according to
court records, shot and killed Peggy’s two pet cats, then “held a gun to Peggy’s
head, threatening to shoot,” and on another occasion he threatened her with a
loaded shotgun.^® Peggy confided in her friends, telling them that Mike would kill
her one day.
One day, Peggy left after having endured years of repeated episodes
which had harmed her physically, emotionally, and psychologically. Peggy
moved to another state and lived with her daughter Laura, who had Peggy
admitted Into a psychiatric hospital for a brief period until Mike came to take her
back home to Kansas. During the drive back, Mike told Peggy he would “kill her
If she ever ran away again.”®®
When the couple arrived at home, Mike proceeded to sexually assault
Peggy against her will, mentioning that she would “not be there long, and could
not take her things where she was going,” a statement which the average
reasonable person would construe to mean that Mike planned to kill Peggy.®^
Mike forced Peggy to have sex with him, and then insisted she sleep with him.
He fell asleep, and Peggy began experiencing auditory hallucinations which
seemed to be saying: “Kill or be killed.”®" Peggy then shot and killed Mike as he
slept.
In this matter, the Kansas State Supreme Court ruled that Peggy was “In
no imminent danger when she shot Mike,” a statement whose seemingly
“obvious” nature belles its actual falsity.®® Under the aforementioned set of
facts, the court ruled, a battered woman “cannot reasonably fear Imminent lifethreatening danger from her sleeping spouse,”®^ The court’s “wisdom” ignored
the “imprisoning effect of Mike’s bringing her back from another state” and his
threat to kill Peggy If she ever left him again.®® To make matters worse, the court
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established a precedent for construing “imminent harm” to be the precise
equivalent of “immediate harm.”
Such legal nuances as the distinction between “immediate” and
“imminent” often Inform the outcomes of later court rulings in abuse cases. In
Stewart the jury was not allowed to hear self-defense instructions from the judge
because “the woman faced no ‘imminent’ danger of threat or bodily harm.”®®
Recent legal decisions which conflate the terms “imminent” and “immediate”
have also led to problems for women who acted In self-defense after they were
battered, since the question of whether a battered woman was in “imminent
danger of death or grave bodily harm” offers the most plausible, most llkely-tosucceed legal defense In instances where the battered woman responded to an
on-going series of batterings by killing the batterer, and especially where It
occurred with “premeditation” on her part. Even though Peggy was in no
Immediate” danger at the precise point in time at which she shot and killed Mike
as he slept, she was in “Imminent” danger In the sense that Mike had threatened
to kill her In the past, and had subjected her to a systematic and seemingly
unabated pattern of physical and emotional abuse.®^
In her book Battered Wives, Del Martin addressed the questions “Why do
these wives stay? Why don’t they pack up their bags and walk out?” by
acknowledging that they are “fair questions,” given the unhappy fact that nobody
can really know what it is like to be a battered woman unless they actually are a
battered woman.®® Experience may be the best, and the cruelest, of all teachers.
Only a small percent of battered women take the life of the batterer; the cases
of Jo and Peggy illustrate an extreme yet understandable pair of responses to
years of battering. Martin’s book effectively chronicles the factors which lead
women to remain with a batterer, and the factors can help foster a greater
understanding and appreciation of the lived experiences of battered women.
The lived experience of a woman as the “battered one” In America
constitutes an arbitrary aggregate of all battered women’s experiences; and, of
course, such a general grouping contains the Inherent problem of not appearing
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“inclusive” (another shopworn term) because the presence of women of color In
the social scheme is not made visible enough. Such an objection should be
dealt with by heeding the voices of women of color, an enterprise with which this
section of the essay will conclude. For the present, however, an examination of
the American battered woman "in general” can be accomplished by exploring the
work of researchers such as Martin, whose 1976 book Battered Wives was
written from her perspective as coordinator of the NOW Task Force on Battered
Women and hence assumed an inherently “liberal" feminist stance. In general,
according to Martin, the most understandable (yet paradoxically least
recognized) explanation Is fear.®® Fear leads to immobility; terror breeds
insanity.
The concept “learned helplessness” has played a crucial and not
uncontroverslal role In shaping society’s perceptions of battered women in
general.®® Learned helplessness, according to R. Emerson Dobash, is “meant to
explain why women do not leave their violent partners,” although some of its
proponents also view it as a sufficient explanation as to why women are
battered.®^ “Learned helplessness” as a concept forms the fundamental basis
for “battered women’s syndrome,” a term which actually entails dubious
consequences for battered women. In the words of Dobash and Dobash,
authors of the book Violence Against Wives, now regarded as a classic in the
field, it “is now recognized that the concepts, ‘learned helplessness’ and
‘battered women’s syndrome’, and especially their use in courts, have fueled
orthodox images of the innate incapacities of women, who appear powerless
unable and unwilling to act to help themselves.”®^ As is so often the case In
social science, a well-intentioned theory has backfired against women, and the
so-called “learned helplessness” stereotype diminishes women in a
dehumanizing, disempowering manner despite its usefulness as a defense In the
comparatively small number of isolated Instances where battered women kill
their batterer.
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Battered women who kill batterers have an interesting appeal to their
stories which belies the reality of the Average Battered Woman. The real
average battered woman is not passive, dependent, and helpless, and instead
has the strength to live in the face of continued terror. Most battered women,
including those who kill their batterer in self-defense, relate stories of fear, love,
devotion, and an absence of options.” As Littleton notes, women who make
“better wives, more submissive helpmates, and more compliant sexual partners”
do not, in the eyes of society, get their noses broken, their eyes blackened, nor
their bodies bruised.” The Average Battered Woman as a stereotype fulfills the
required qualities for full categorization under the heading "woman,” but the
“real” average battered woman often deviates by not being submissive and
compliant, hence “causing” her battering, from the traditional perspective. It was
something about her, according to this all-too-familiar logic.
Del Martin's pioneering work deconstructs the image of the Average
Battered Woman by examining the nature of society, and the “socially
determined” reasons that women often stay with a batterer. Traditional
American values play a large role, implying that a woman's “primary source of
satisfaction is her marriage,”” Some women adopt that notion as part of their
identity, and actually take full responsibility for a bad marriage even if they were
beaten. “Her sense of responsibility will lead her to feel ashamed if her marriage
fails,” writes Martin, “and she will try above all else to save face.””
One recently divorced battered mother of five spoke to Martin about the
violence she endured at the hands of her batterer over the course of an
eighteen-year marriage. “Well-educated, well-to-do people don't discuss such
things [i.e., violence, abuse],” the battered mother said. “I became a super
cover-up artist. Shielding five children from the fact their father took snipes at
their mother was easy compared to the elaborate excuses designed for
friends.”” Further, daily interaction between the batterer and the battered
woman does not consistently lead to violence and, in fact, can sometimes seem
rather pleasant. As Martin explains, “from time to time [a battered wife] may
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have a friendly exchange with her husband," thus generating a source of hope
that somehow the battering will end.“
A vicious circle” situation constitutes a not uncommon scenario, during
which the battered woman makes attempts at "reasoning” and “rationalizing” her
predicament in order to make sense of it. Nurturing women, those most inclined
to feel an attachment with their batterer because he so commonly “needs her,”
sometimes do not feel “complete” unless they are caring for another, a “loved
one.

Upon brief consideration, such women may validly conclude that, the more

violent the batterer becomes, the sicker he must be, and so therefore he needs
her all the more.” From this tortured logic it can sometimes follow that the more
the batterer needs her, the more he loves her, and thus the more she “loves” him
in return. Martin refers to this as a "peculiar but very common permutation of
marital affection."'”
Yet research has identified a general trend toward the likelihood that the
average marriage between a batterer and a battered woman will change across
time, rather than remain static and self-defeating, as the “battered women’s
syndrome” would clearly seem to suggest. Considerable change has been
reported in terms of the violence itself, patterns of seeking help, and the battered
woman's perception of “the problem and her predicament.”'®’ As a result, by
today the results of research on the problem shows a marked distinction
between “traditional” (family values-oriented) ideas of “domesticity as vocation,”
and "contemporary” (community-oriented) notions of therapy and active
neighborhood networks of assistance, a distinction which is shaped by the
difference between the image of the Average Battered Woman, and the reality of
average battered women. The popular misconception of the general public
regarding the average battered woman portrays a hopeless, helpless woman
who “may have a mental problem or something” which leads her to somehow
consciously choose men who inevitably batter her during a relationship. This
false Image serves to move the blame entirely away from the batterer.
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As Oobash writes, studies in the U S. and Engiand have been conducted
on the responses of women who have endured “severe, persistent, usually
escalating violence,” and the results demonstrate that battered women do not
remain heipless and inactive, but instead enter the public domain to seek help
through a network of agencies, organizations, and individuais. Battered
women's real lives often belie the prevalent notions of “passive, helpless victims”
who have an abundance of problems to the extent that it appears as if society
believes that battered women (not the batterer) need immediate counseling.’”
The “iearned heiplessness" stereotype was initially advanced by
Professor of Psychology Lenore Walker, whose 1979 bestseller The Battered
Woman chronicled the “discovery” of a “cycie of vioience,” a “discovery” which
Walker claims was based on “deduction from the empirical evidence" about the
phenomenon.'” The theory of “learned helplessness” has seen wide
acceptance among the lay public as well as some dissent from within academia,
and its tenets have become a cuiturally constructed “norm” of the Average
Battered Woman. In Walker's theory, battered women experience an on-going
three phase cycle which inciudes tension-buiiding, an explosive battering, and a
“calm, loving respite.”^°^
Lenore Walker’s theory has become pervasive enough to have actually
seen its way into university textbooks as a “satisfactory explanation” of violence
against women. The “three-phase cycle theory” seems quite plausible on its
face. Elizabeth Schneider’s summary of Waiker's theoretical stages includes a
“tension-building stage characterized by discrete abusive events; an acute
battering stage characterized by uncontroilable explosions of brutal violence by
the batterer; and a loving respite characterized by calm and loving behavior and
pleas for forgiveness.
The battered women's (“iearned helplessness”) syndrome contains a
certain intrinsic appeal. It has the neat, tidy characteristics of a good popular
theory, especially its scientific “ring of truth” and its impiicitly determinative view
of human nature. After a woman becomes a battered woman, in theory her iife is
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bound by a pre-determIned cycle of three inevitable stages. As Schneider has
argued, the fact that expert testimony Invariably leads to an attempt to bring
Walker’s theory into testimony “has shaped judicial treatment of the issue in
problematic ways."^®® Although the syndrome’s Initial focus was on battered
women and “learned helplessness” as a legitimate response to being battered,
in some measure the battered women’s syndrome carries real, major drawbacks.
One main problem stems from the fact that the term “battered women’s
syndrome” has “been heard to communicate an explicit but powerful view that
battered women are all the same, that they are suffering from a psychological
disability and that this prevents them from acting ‘normally.’

Significantly,

the battered women’s syndrome effectively deflects attention away from the
batterer, leaving him lurking enigmatically someplace In the background. Also,
since the syndrome stems primarily from the discipline of psychology, it runs an
inherent risk of minimizing and neglecting economic and social factors.^®®
According to Dobash, the more that women In the battered women’s movement
adopt the individual, psychological position on abused women, the greater
likelihood that it will dismiss or ignore the political, social and economic issues
surrounding the problem of male violence against women.
Today, much consensus holds that society would be “better off” if it dealt
with the fundamental causes of women getting battered. Enforcing the existing
laws Is important, but the legal system’s numerous drawbacks entail a need for a
more humane set of social programs and new, alternative means of dealing with
the crisis of battered women in America, preferably by taking aim at Its “root
causes. This task would be difficult to Implement, yet it would probably be
worth the undertaking. Reasonable, responsible citizens everywhere would
undoubtedly agree that the ultimate elimination of violent sexism Is, at the very
least, a highly “noble” aspiration.
African American scholar Angela Y. Davis, an avowed socialist political
activist and lecturer, addressed the topic “Violence Against Women and the
Ongoing Challenge to Racism” In a speech she delivered at Florida State
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University in 1985. During her speech, Davis launched directly into the issue of
violence against women, stating that “rape, sexual extortion, battering, spousal
rape, child sexual abuse and incest are among many forms of overt sexual
violence suffered by millions of women in this country.”^^° Davis argued in her
lecture that “these particular manifestations of violence against women” exist at
locations along “a larger continuum of systematic and equally violent assaults on
women s economic and political rights, especially the rights of women of color
and their white working class sisters.
Davis has long been an important spokesperson and a major influential
thinker among global feminists, many of whom are women of color and tend to
focus on feminist issues from a world-wide global context. Davis’ Tallahassee
speech demonstrates this “global aspect” of most third wave feminism today.
Davis gave her lecture during the first year of Reagan’s second term, and her
speech partially lambasted the president and his policies, and it partially
exposed overt male power at its meanest and its harshest.
Citing a veritable “laundry list” of overt sexual violence, Davis mentioned
denial of access to abortion rights due to funding, terrorist activity at abortion
clinics, bomb threats, the abuse of Impoverished women through sterilization,
the Daikon shield and “other potentially fatal methods of birth control,” and “the
rights of lesbians to reproduce outside the confines of heterosexual
relationships.”^^^
“The dreadful rape epidemic of our times,” Davis stated, “ which has come
to be so widespread that about one of every three women in this country can
expect to be raped at some point during her life, directly affects the deteriorating
economic and social status of women today.Davis continued.'
Moreover this rising violence against women Is related to domestic racial
violence as well as global imperialist aggression. In fact, the conduct of
the Reagan administration over the last four and a half years makes clear
that it is not only the most sexist government-the only one, for example,
to actively oppose the Equal Rights Amendment at the very same time it
supports the sexist and homophobic Family Life Amendment; and It Is not
only the most racist government-persistently attempting to dismantle
thirty years of gains by the civil rights movement; but it is also by far the
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most fiercely war-mongering government of this century. Indeed for the
first time in the history of humankind, we face the very real threat of global
nuclear omnicide.”^

Professor Davis’ lecture demonstrates the global feminist propensity for
viewing feminist Issues at a macro-level. Davis’ speech also demonstrates a
working understanding of the problem of male violence against women at a more
personal, Individual level. This technique of working from a global to an
individual level constitutes one of the more intriguing and effective
methodological tools of “third wave” feminism and Its proponents.
Davis’ speech explored some important historical highlights of the effort of
the women’s liberation movement of the early 1970s to address the issue of
male violence, and then examined some of the lived experiences of those who
have faced such violence at the Individual level. As a speaker, Angela Davis
knows no parallel, and her audience at Florida State University listened with
intensity as she delivered her lecture, and as she described the unfolding
scenario of the 1970s anti-rape movements. “Along with the campaign to
decriminalize abortion,” Davis explained, “the anti-rape movement proved to be
the most dramatic movement associated with the fight for women’s freedom.
As Davis correctly asserts, the anti-rape movement proved to be an
effective tool for confronting violence against women; yet the lack of focus on
battered women as a “social subset” of violently abused women may have
tended to shift the focus away from the problem of battered women to the
problem of sexual assault, two intertwined issues which people tend to see as
much more separate and distinct than they actually are. Nonetheless, evidence
suggests that the anti-rape movement has probably had the more salutary effect
of breathing greater life into the battered women’s movement, especially with
regard to the tremendous need for women’s shelters.
Davis discussed the rise of shelters and 24-hour crisis centers in the
1970s, and then examined the Individual case of Susan Griffin, whose historical
article in a 1971 issue of Ramparts opened with the words, “I have never been
free of the fear of rape. From a very early age I, like most women, have thought
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of rape as part of my natural environment. I never asked why women were
raped, I simply thought of It as one of the many mysteries of human nature.
Societal assumptions regarding rape and battered women entail similar
myths, and so it is useful to examine Professor Davis' speech with regard to the
means by which she addresses prevalent myths about rape. Feminists in the
seventies “militantly refused the myth that the rape victim is morally responsible
for the crime committed against her.”^^^ This myth also obtains In the case of
battered women, If from a somewhat different perspective. Battered women
typically feel an exaggerated sense of responsibility for their fate and their
family s fate; in either Instance, whether a women gets raped or gets physically
beaten, the unfortunate failure of society to focus on the moral responsibility of
men demonstrates the traditional patriarchal tendency In American politics to
shift the burden entirely on the person or persons harmed (women), rather than
on the person or persons who perpetrated the harm (men).
In Davis’ lecture, she effectively deconstructed other myths pertaining to
sexual assault, such as the misogynist view that “if a woman does not resist, she
is implicitly Inviting the violation of her body.” Society is much less apt today, as
It

once was. to see wife beating as a “victim-precipitated crime" in the same sort

of manner as sometimes occurs when a woman gets raped, but the legal
system s responses to issues of violence against women. Including rape, can
sometimes reveal the “morally corrupt” nature of the nation’s patriarchal legal
system. Davis cites a 1977 case where a male Wisconsin judge ruled that a
fifteen year old male’s rape of a teenager" constituted a “normal reaction” to the
“provocative dress” of the young woman he raped, even though she was
dressed in a loose shirt, Levi’s, and tennis shoes at the time her rape
occurred.
“Male privilege” in patriarchy entails male invisibility In cases of male
violence when a batterer demands and receives anonymity, the “spiritual
foundation” of ail misogynist traditions. Hence, a need exists for a clearer focus
on the problem of men, preferably from a man’s perspective. As a result, this
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paper will explore the legal and social history of domestic violence and assault
against women, and then will conclude by exploring the problem of battered
women as a men s Issue. Men, as Davis writes, enjoy anonymity as a privilege
inferred by their relatively higher social status, which also effectively protects
them from prosecution."®
“But,” asks Davis, “why are there so many anonymous rapists in the first
place?"'“ Upon raising this question, Davis draws an analysis grounded in
Marxist theory, which is standard part and parcel of global feminist theory. “The
class structure of capitalism," she asserts, “encourages men who wield power in
the economic and political realm to become agents of sexual exploitation. The
present rape epidemic occurs at a time when the capitalist class is furiously
reasserting its authority in the face of global and internal challenges. Both
racism and sexism, central to its domestic strategy of increased economic
exploitation, are receiving unprecedented encouragement."”' This analysis
essentially holds true with regard to the problem of battered women; “Why,” one
might plausibly ask, “are there so many anonymous batterers?” The obvious
answer, for Davis and her comrades, is the dominant class “and its on-going
reassertion of its authority in the face of challenges, global and internal."'”
Rhetoric such as the phrase “the movement... must be situated in a
strategic context which envisages the ultimate defeat of monopoly capitalism”
probably ultimately detract from Davis' overall political effectiveness, however.'”
As Professor Barbara Epstein pointed out in a recent lecture at Western
Washington University, two major factors have taken place globally to
undermine the credibility of the “political left” (however one may define it) in
general, and its attitude toward capitalism in particular. For one, the
globalization of capital has resulted in “capital today whizzing around the globe
at high speed...[and] an increase in competition internationally has led to social
programs being pared down."'” Also, with the 1991 collapse of the Soviet
Union, Epstein remarked, conventional wisdom holds that “capitalism remains
the only viable system in the world, and it is hard to defend any other system
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today.

Thus, Davis’ socialism constitutes a practical hindrance to the

effectiveness of her global perspective.
The “shopworn question” (why didn’t she just leave?) does not as readily
obtain with African American women. It Is interesting to note that the question
really seems to apply primarily to white women, especially in a stereotyped
sense. Its answers do not serve to inform society’s view of battered black
women, and Davis’ belief In the view that violent, unbridled white male racism
and sexism constitute the true historical cause of social injustice is not entirely
atypical or unwarranted as a belief. Davis, who argues against the “myth of the
black rapist,” argues that in some sense the “oppression of women was identical
to the oppression of men” during slavery, but that “women suffered In different
ways as well, for they were victims of sexual abuse and other barbarous
mistreatment that could only be Inflicted on women. When they could be
exploited, punished and repressed In ways suited only for women, they were
locked Into their exclusive female roles.”^^® The history of domestic violence
against women in America clearly includes the experiences of enslaved women,
who legally suffered egregiously violent injustice at the hands of their white male
owners on a daily on-going basis, a phenomenon which occurred In American
for hundreds of years. Of course, it nearly goes unsaid that the question “why
didn’t she just leave?” does not obtain with respect to enslaved African American
women. The difference is so stark as to be a matter of black and white.
An examination of the history of formal U.S. public policy and informal,
private U.S. women s personal lives will invariably cross the socially constructed
barrier between the “personal” and the “political” so often as to challenge the
validity of the dualism’s existence as a plausible entity. The history of the
problematic issue of battered women delineates a transformation of the “public /
private dichotomy into a much less rigid, much more loose and informal doctrine
by which women’s groups can achieve greater gender justice for battered
women in American society, and perhaps elsewhere in the world. The history of
battered women in America and, to some extent, the nation’s “mother” country

(England) demonstrates the need for men to re-define their roles in the public
domain, and to foster positive ethical characteristics among themselves In order
to prevent some men from hitting some women.

Battered Women; History Lessons
Prior to the recent “discovery” of wife beating and marital rape by
women’s llberationists In the early 1970s, two earlier eras of reform of violence
against women occurred in the United States. Of these two earlier attempts to
address the social phenomenon of wife beating, the first took place in the mid
seventeenth century, and the second occurred during the latter twenty five years
of the nineteenth century. In the earlier instance, Puritans at the Massachusetts
colony enacted the first laws known to have been passed anywhere in the world
against wife beating and “unnatural severity to chlldren.”^^^ Later, in the
VIctorian-era years between 1874 and 1890, smaller efforts on behalf of battered
women occurred within the larger context of a movement aimed at male violence
against children, a time when “societies for the preservation of cruelty to children
(SPCCs)” were first formed.
The history of battered women in the U.S. actually constitutes an
acknowledgment that a percentage of American women have always been
getting battered. The Puritans were not entirely unfamiliar with English law, and
so they brought an unsophisticated sort of "bewildered awareness” of family law
with them from the British homeland. As America’s mother country, England and
“her system of common law and social custom played a critical and pivotal role
in the development and formation of a new code of law to govern Puritan
American society. By the mid-1800s, English reformers successfully worked for
the passage of legislation and the establishment of new programs for battered
women. As U.S. women’s historian Elizabeth Pleck notes, the term “wife
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beating” was actually first coined as part of a political campaign for divorce
reform in England.
To understand the problem of battered women in America, It will be
necessary to look at the nation’s “mother country” and its laws, since the U.S
legal system relies so heavily on British “common law” as its single most
Important historical base. The Puritans brought English tradition with them, as
did many other groups of immigrants. English law regarding male violence dates
back to the appearance of Justices of the Peace, which were established for
women who sought protection from violent bodily harm. In a 1581 British
Handbook for Justices of the Peace, a legal distinction was drawn between
“natural” and “civil” power, with the term “civil power” referring to authority
created and sanctioned by law.^“ As historian Maeve Doggett explains, a
“parent’s power over a child fell In the former category [“natural”], and a
husband’s over his wife into the latter [“civil"] along with that of a master over his
servants, a schoolmaster over his pupils, a jailer over his unruly prisoners and a
lord over his vassals.”^^^ Hence, during the sixteenth century the state of
matrimony constituted a civil institution, constructed by society as a “masterservant” type of relationship between a husband and his wife.
An Important precedent regarding wife beating was set in the infamous Sir
Thomas Seymour’s Case of 1613. In the case. Sir Thomas first threatened his
wife, and then he battered her. Afterward, his wife sought a separation and
maintenance from Sir Thomas on grounds of his overt cruelty toward her.^^^ Sir
Thomas sought prohibition from the civil courts to prevent the ecclesiastical
courts from acting on the matter, and he argued that his wife had a legitimate
common law remedy through the charge of assault and battery. The judges
actually disagreed, declaring that “a wife could have no remedy at common law
against a husband who beat her for she was ‘sub virgi virl,’ that Is, under the rule
of the husband.”^^
Although it is widely believed that English law “imposed some kind of
restriction on the kind of Instrument” with which a wife could be battered, legal
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authority is elusive at best (and non-existent at worst) regarding any regulation
of such instruments of brutality.The pioneer British feminist Frances Power
Cobbe wrote a scathing essay which denounced a statute purportedly enacted
during the reign of Charles II, between 1660 and 1685, which “embodied the
common laws, and authorized a man to chastise his wife with any reasonable
instrument.’’^^
As Doggett has written, however, the aforementioned reference to
chastisement with “any reasonable instrument” may have been historically
inaccurate: nonetheless, it is reminiscent of the more famous, but “equally
elusive legal authority, the “rule of thumb.”^^® Doggett maintains that it “seems
unlikely that the statement [‘rule of thumb’] was made in an official capacity”;
yet, the fact that these “reasonable instruments” and “rules of thumb” existed in
English custom lends credence to the notion that women have long suffered
under the violent hands of male authority.

Unprovoked, unrestrained male

violence cannot be said to constitute a new “discovery,” or a new phenomenon,
in any sense.
“Legal” wife beating saw Its way into the literature and formal statutory law
in England by 1716, and the 1736 publication of Bacon’s New Abridgment of the
Law proved to be the most influential work of the era. Especially important was
the following passage:
The husband hath, by law, power and dominion over his wife,
and may keep her by force with burden of duty, and may beat her,
but not in a violent and cruel manner.
The man had the legal right to batter a woman, so long as the couple
lived under the “pains of legal matrimony” and the husband was not too violent
and cruel. Various sorts of blatant Injustice were matters of public policy; of all
the English common law concepts to find its way Into the legal system and
American jurisprudence, the worst was probably the Infamous doctrine of
Coverture. As Sir William Blackstone stated, a husband’s right to “chastise and
refine” his wife arose from Coverture;
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As the husband is to answer for his wife's misbehavior, the law thouoht
It reasonable to intrust him with this power of restraining her, in the same
moderation that a man is aliowed to correct his apprentices or children.’^
Blackstone himself advanced the argument that Coverture was justified
due to the fact that the husband was “bound by contracts his wife made in his
name; he was liable jointly with her for her forts; and, he could be held
cnminally responsible for his wife's conduct."’” While It seems difficult to
envision many men suffering very much injustice due to their wife's torts, it is
interesting that such a phrase would appear in eighteenth century black letter
law.
To Blackstone, the unparalleled British legal authority of his day, the
chief legal effects of marriage during the Coverture, even the disabilities which
the wife lies under are for the most part intended for her protection and
benefit,""” Such “benign correction” constituted a matter of public policy in
England, based primarily on the notion that a wife did not legally exist as a
person when married. According to Blackstone's famous Commentaries, by
marriage the husband and wife became “one person in law: that is, the very
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at
least is consolidated or incorporated into that of the husband."’” Hence,
paternal patriarchal attitudes toward “protection and benefit” of the wife inspired
a monstrous “legal fiction” which functioned to effectively eliminate the legal
existence of women, causing each married woman to become an “invisible”
social construct from the perspective of the public patriarchal power structure.
The question of whether law reflected, or affected, British society in
Biackstone's era can be answered by responding that the law was more than
likely a reflection of the existing ideology of British patriarchal power, and the
law's effects were therefore an extension of the tentacles of British common law,
acting as a “top-down” phenomenon in terms of its adverse impact on women's
lives. Legally, of course, women did not exist under Coverture, a fact which
undoubtedly made it somewhat difficult to face life on life's terms.
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In America, the earliest reform movement to openly depict the harsh
reality of domestic violence for the lay public was seen in the women’s
“temperance movement," an indirect attempt to deal with male violence by
confronting its perceived cause: alcohol. As Pleck states, temperance
reformers “regarded family violence not as a distinct social problem, but as an
evil consequence of alcohol."^” Thus, eliminating the cause would diminish the
tragic consequences of alcohol abuse, including domestic violence against
women.
As Pleck observes, nineteenth century temperance reformers and
activists firmly believed the link between alcohol and wife beating was clear and
direct, and most of them “naively believed that excessive drink was the cause of
domestic violence, rather than a precipitating factor or convenient excuse for
violent behavior.” Family violence in the nineteenth century was. In fact,
understood in terms of “male brutishness” and “female purity,” the battered wife
being the victim of a drunken male “brute.”^^
According to Pleck, the prevalent Image of the “brutish wife beater seems
to “have appeared first in the 1830s.”'“ There was actually no more appropriate
reform than temperance for women activists In the 1830s, according to the logic
of the day; because drink “enbruted” men. those battered women who most
gravely felt the direct effects of male brutishness aligned themselves with public
temperance activists. Working within the movement, women’s influence led
directly to “legislative action against alcoholism, lobbying state legislatures
through petition campaigns for the passage of laws prohibiting the sale of liquor,
establishing dry districts, and imposing saloon closings on Sunday.”^®® :
Women’s temperance activism successfully ushered in the first wave of feminism
in the mid 1800s, as feminists began broadening the scope of their demands.
The “first wave” feminists of nineteenth century America adhered to the
precepts of classical liberalism and they were well-versed in the political
philosophies of men such as John Locke and John Stuart Mill; Mill’s speech to
the House of Commons in 1867 adamantly denounced the fact that battering, or

37

physically tyranny, could “be inflicted upon women almost without impunity.”^^
Speaking before a large number of British legislators, Mill said: “I should like to
have a return laid before thine House of the number of women who are actually
beaten to death, kicked to death, and trampled to death by their ‘male
protectors.’
Such male protectors” were, of course, the actual batterers themselves,
men who arbitrarily became the dominant power In any marital arrangement they
entered, solely by virtue of their gender category. In the U.S., the Women’s
Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) played a major role In the establishment
of an interesting policy to protect battered women. Battered women were not to
be directly protected from the batterer himself, under the new policy; Instead,
women received protection from the saloonkeeper. As Pleck writes, “no
nineteenth-century court granted a battered woman the right to sue her husband
from damages arising from his assault upon her.”^®® In fact, American suffragists
and temperance activists apparently never even considered the aforementioned
legal remedy, but instead reasoned that “the major enemy of the home was the
saloonkeeper,” and so a battered wife “ought to be able to bring suit against the
man who served her husband.”^®®
As a result of the efforts of the WCTU, New York and Arkansas each
passed legislation in 1873 which gave a battered woman the right to sue the
saloonkeeper, or the owner, for damages Incurred when an intoxicated batterer
had been served at a public drinking establishment. Within the next two
decades, twenty states had enacted legislation making saloons liable for a
battered wife’s damages.

The batterer, it was believed, was the direct victim

of “demon rum,” and his behavior while “under the influence" was the
responsibility of the person(s) who had served him the liquor.
Feminists of the era advanced the argument that physical and sexual
cruelty toward one’s wife arose from “a husband’s ownership of his wife’s
body.

Often, nineteenth-century American wives were victimized by a

husband’s excessive sexual demands, and marital rape was certainly not
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uncommon. Many women began to believe they needed the right to divorce
their abusive husbands. ** As Pleck observes in her excellent historical account
of American family violence Domestic Tyranny, it was “not until the twentieth
century that statutes exempted women from protection from marital rape,” but
“wives in several states had the option of bringing suit for divorce on grounds of
sexual brutality. It was assumed that a wife who complained of sexual assault
by her husband could sue for divorce.”'" This proved problematic, however,
due to Coverture. When a married woman does not legally exist separately from
her husband, his actions against her do not constitute an 'actionable cause’.
In an influential essay from David Kairy's book The Politics of Law.
Nadine Taub and Elizabeth Schneider combined their historiographical talents
and relied on their strong feminist convictions to develop an insightful analysis of
the law's role in American women’s subordination.’*® Although much has been
written about women’s legal exclusion from the formal public sphere, the
absence of law and the failure of government to intervene in the private domain
(where a man’s home was his castle) led to the seemingly incredible, yet
factually true, phenomenon of the law “looking the other way” as women were
being cruelly battered in nineteenth century America. This pattern continued
unabated into the twentieth century and, to some extent, continues at the
present time.
As Taub and Schneider explain, “tort law” may be generally concerned
with injuries inflicted on individuals, but in terms of wife beating in America
during the nineteenth century, tort law has “traditionally been held inapplicable
to injuries inflicted by one family member on another.”'" Wife beating,
according to Taub and Schneider, was "initially omitted from the definition of
criminal assault on the ground that a husband had the right to chastise his
wife.”'®^
Wife beating has generally maintained the tacit approval of the patriarchal
American legal system, a system which did not recognize a woman’s civil
existence upon marriage due to Coverture. Even today, when the police fail to
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respond to “a battered woman’s call for assistance,” or when “a civil court
refuses to evict her husband,” the battered woman becomes relegated to selfhelp resources, while her batterer receives the tacit acceptance of the law.'“
First wave feminists began directly confronting the issue of family
violence, although it was typically a part of a much larger “women's rights”
agenda. Stanton and Anthony mentioned family violence during some of their
speeches, but it was certainly not the cause for which they have been
remembered the most. One particular “relatively conservative” suffragette, Lucy
Stone, became known for her diatribes with regard to family violence. Stone,
during her day, had the reputation for being “more proper and respectable—more
willing to cooperate with male reformers-than Stanton and Anthony.”’®* With
Stone, the problem of “crimes against women” found its most respectable
possible advocate, a suffragist who could not be “tamed by association with
advocates of free love or other radicals.”’”*
Shortly following the end of the U.S. Civil War, Stone began editing a
women's rights newspaper. The Woman's Journal. Before Stone took over, the
Woman's Journal had featured numerous editorials such as one which
proclaimed that divorce, when it was granted, constituted an “escape out of
tyranny into freedom.”’^’ Under Stone’s conservative editorial policy, however,
editorials such as the one pertaining to divorce vanished; but, by 1876, the
Woman's Journal had begun publishing a weekly account of “crimes against
women” in New England. Stone held the view that the law treated battered
women unjustly, and was far too lenient in its treatment of batterers.’”
Stone decided to suspend “standards of propriety” in detailing accounts of
male family violence; in every single instance, “male lust” contributed to the
victimization of women. Under the Woman's Journal column headed “crimes
against women,” readers found stories of wife beating, wife murder, rape and
incest.’” Stone sought to persuade her middle-class reading audience that it
was necessarily the time to take action against wife-beating, and she sought to
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demonstrate “how great masculine brutality was” in order to "refute the belief that
women provoked violence.”"^

In 1879, Stone introduced a bill in the Massachusetts state legislature
designed to protect battered wives from their assailants (husbands). The new
law proposed granting a battered wife the legal right to apply for a separation, to
receive an order for spousal and child support, and to obtain custody of her
children. Stone introduced and lobbied for the proposed legislation in 1879,
1883, and 1891, but it failed to gain enactment each time.
The famous English suffragist Frances Power Cobbe provided Stone with
the idea for the proposed legislation when she sent Stone a copy of a similar
“protection bill” she had helped pass in Parliament.As a prominent public
figure in her own right, Cobbe transcended traditional gender boundaries to
become a successful journalist, essayist, social critic, philanthropist, theologian,
and moralist, and she was deeply devoted to actively seeking meaningful reform
on behalf of women of all social classes. When Cobbe challenged the English
judiciary so as to affect social change, Cobbe was challenging firmly entrenched
Victorian attitudes toward wife-beating in England, a nation whose laws
traditionally “mirrored the public acceptance of wife-beating and, in turn,
reinforced
As an advocate for battered women in England in the latter half of the
nineteenth century, Cobbe knew quite well what she and her Victorian feminist
allies were up against. As historians Bauer and Ritt have written, Cobbe knew
that the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1878, which provided for protection of
battered wives by allowing them the possibility of obtaining protective orders
which had the legal effect of a judicial separation, and which also provided the
legislative model for U.S. feminist Lucy Stone to follow, would be “no more than
palliative” because “wife-beating, on its most fundamental level, reflected the
underlying disparity between the sexes,” The solution to this disparity, Cobbe
believed, was “beyond the scope of any parliamentary act.”'™
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Nonetheless, Cobbe championed the 1878 Act because of her
tremendous commitment to feminism at a time when English judges still took the
opportunity to confirm the legality of ancient male privilege. One particular judge
wrote that “there can be no doubt of the general dominion which the law of
England attributes to the husband over the wife."'” This “general dominion"
over a wife allowed a husband to correct her through physical punishment, and
to restrict her individual personal freedom so she could not leave.”®
As Cobbe had quietly and realistically predicted, the legislative intent
behind the Matrimonial Causes Act of 1878 was adversely manipulated by
conservative, traditionalist male judges who were perched in positions of power
all throughout the patriarchy. Other English Victorian-era feminists watched and
became appalled by the incredible yet widespread leniency judges gave wife
beaters. The Act had, by its design, granted judges the “summary jurisdiction” to
award orders of separation, but it proved to be a rare event when a judge ruled
in a battered wife’s favor. In one notorious case, a husband had been previously
found guilty of brutally assaulting his wife on several occasions, yet the wife’s
request for a separation order to protect her from further such assaults was
denied, and the batterer spent a mere twenty-one days in prison for his most
recent violent physical attack against his wife.’®’
Wife beating has always been deeply rooted in English law. The power of
a husband to correct his wife, by physical force if necessary, has historically
been justified by British civil and ecclesiastical courts as the legal rendering of a
Christian conceptualization of marriage as an arrangement whereby a man must
leave his father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife: and they twain shall
be one flesh.”’“ As a femme couverte, a wife legally surrendered her services,
her property, and her children to her husband’s “protection,” as his vassal under
Coverture.”® Whether the husband actually provided protection or not, his wife
was legally duty-bound to comply with his wishes, since she was not legally
viewed as any more “competent” to appear in court than a child. In one
ecclesiastical court case in 1395, witnesses testified that Margaret Nettefeld’s
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husband had attacked her on several occasions with a knife and a dagger,
wounding one of her arms and breaking one of her bones. When Nettefeld’s
husband informed the judge that his actions were “motivated solely by the desire
to preserve her from error," the court ruled in the batterer's favor.’"
By the nineteenth century, courts in England and the U.S. had
consistently upheld Coverture, even to the extent that women enjoyed the same
legal rights in marriage as “criminals, idiots, and minors” always did, meaning
that they had none. As Cobbe pointed out, the wife-beater differed from other
violent individuals in society because he could feel assured that society would
tolerate, condone, and sanction his brutal conduct. This held true on both sides
of the Atlantic, in the United States as well as in England, and society’s failure to
cease sanctioning such violence within marriage tended to aggravate the
probiem.'*® To Frances Power Cobbe, the most abhorrent aspect of this
publicly sanctioned violence against women was the fact that “many clergymen
perceived society’s acceptance of wife-abuse as consistent with Christian
teachings.”’* When the Reverend F.W. Harper linked wife-beating with
religious duty in a sermon, declaring that “the true idea of marriage is the
relation of Christ to his Church, Cobbe responded angrily, saying “Heaven help
the poor women of Durham and Lancashire if their clergy lead them to picture a
Christ resembling their husbands.””'
The differences between what a society condones, and what is immoral
and unjust, can sometimes be tremendous. The entire nineteenth century
provides ample evidence to support the claim that the majority of society can be
(and often is) “wrong-headed” in its appraisal of vexing social issues. Slavery
and wife beating constitute two of the foremost examples of the widespread
commission of egregious injustice meeting with the tolerance and tacit approvai
of the dominant society. Law generally reflects prevailing social values,
attitudes, and trends, and nineteenth century judges and lawmakers generally
ignored the widespread abuse and mistreatment of women and people of color.
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although they sometimes issued rulings and passed laws which either furthered
its occurrence or did little to diminish it.

As the aforementioned U.S. women’s historian Elizabeth Pleck has
observed, by the end of the nineteenth century, feminists In the U.S. and
England had actively worked to persuade enough Americans and Englishmen of
the wrongfulness of wife beating that legislative change gradually began
occurring.

In the United States,” writes Pleck, “antebellum feminists regarded

wife beating as a crime, but they were primarily interested In providing abused
women with a divorce on the grounds of drunkenness or cruelty.”^®* This was
not to be the case, however; by the end of the nineteenth century, wife beating
had become a law-and-order issue, buried In an avalanche of arguments about
the best means to deter crime."^®® Divorce reform remained an elusive feminist
goal, despite an abundance of evidence to demonstrate that battered women
were often legally bound to remain married to violent husbands who battered
them.
In the 1830s and 1840s, when wage work and professions within the
public domain replaced household production as the mainstay of the American
economy, the “ideal traditional Victorian family” arose as a consequence of a
new division of labor based primarily on gender and age, a division which
emerged among the American middle class. Men became the “breadwinners,”
an unheard-of identity in colonial America, and white middle class women’s roles
were re-defined, as “maternal guidance” supplanted the “patriarchal
authoritarianism of the colonial and post-revolutionary war days.^®® As
historian Stephanie Coontz has aptly noted, the “middle-class Victorian family
depended for its existence on the multiplication of other families who were too
poor and powerless to retreat into their own little oases and who therefore had to
provision the oases of others.”^®^ Although the spread of new textile mills freed
white middle class women from their most demanding, time-consuming tasks,
such as making cloth, domesticity was not an available option for most American
families. Obviously, slave families could not take advantage of domesticity as a
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vocation: as Coontz writes, the “raw material of [the new] mills were produced
by slave labor,” and domesticity was also not an option for “the white families
who worked twelve hours a day In Northern factories and workshops
transforming slave-picked cotton into ready-made clothing.”^“ Clearly, the
minority of American families who could be placed Into the category “Victorian"
relied on the vast majority of other families In the U.S., families with no real hope
of ever realizing the American Dream, even if they lived according to the tenets
of Victorian-era standards of white middle-class morality. As Coontz explains:
For every nineteenth-century middle-class family that protected
Its wife and child within the family circle, there was an Irish or a German
girl scrubbing floors In that middle-class home, a Welsh boy mining
to keep the home-baked goodies warm, a black girl doing the family
laundry, a black mother and child picking cotton to be made into clothes
for the family, and a Jewish or an Italian daughter in a sweatshop making
“ladies”’ dresses or artificial flowers for the family to purchase.
In her book Heroes of Thoir Own Lives, historian Linda Gordon examined
“how male dominance is enforced by, and produces, violence against women.”^®^
During specific domestic conflicts, when women are assertive, such
assertiveness Is not a bad thing, according to Gordon; “women’s suppression
of their needs and opinions is by far the greater danger.”^®® Hence, “Victorian
longings for women without egos or aggression,” writes Gordon, “should be
understood as misogynist myths.”^®®
The middle-class Victorian familial “myth” produced an important
Ideological foundation for the “ideal” nineteenth century American family, and it
served to inform prevalent notions of “true” womanhood in the hearts and minds
of Victorian feminist reformers. As Gordon writes, feminist reformers’ view of
womens’ proper role “ruled out the possibility that women could create
independent lives and reject violent husbands.’^®^ To nineteenth century
feminists, women who submitted to abuse were deemed more praiseworthy than
those battered women who left their abusive husbands. As Gordon explains,
“Women’s victimization meant virtue more than weakness,” and thus provided
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evidence that battered women clung steadfastly to their commitments to fulfilling
virtuous wifely duties despite the pattern of battering they received.’”
Wifely duties" aside, Gordon’s study of nineteenth century clients of
Massachusetts child-welfare agencies reveals a startling fact: In the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, many women clients “did not seem to believe they
had a ‘right’ to freedom from physical violence."’” Social workers who lauded a
battered woman’s commitment to her familial duties also expressed disgust at
the evidence of marital violence they encountered. Most battered wives,
however, saw their caseworker’s reaction as “naive,” and they often spoke of the
“inevitability of male violence” as if it were part and parcel of being bound
together with a man for life in holy matrimony.
As the nineteenth century drew to a close, prevailing attitudes toward wife
beating in America had taken a sharp turn to the conservative right. As Gordon
observes, the “condemnation of wife-beating” had “made substantial progress by
the late nineteenth century. Contrary to some common misconceptions, wife
beating was not generally regarded as a head-of-household’s right at this time,
but [instead] was considered a disreputable, seamy practice."”’
Wife beating may not have been seen as “legitimate,” but neither was
public discussion of the subject. The issue, as Gordon notes, was “influential
throughout the nineteenth century women’s-rights movement, but it was
addressed primarily indirectly, through temperance, child welfare, and social
purity campaigns, and only marginally through direct lobbying for legislation or
Judicial reforms regarding wife-beating.””“ As Pleck observes, Lucy Stone’s
failure to achieve enactment of any legislation against wife beating
“strengthened her belief that women would never be protected from wife brutality
until their legal rights were guaranteed.
At a time when Boston police statistics Indicated that over five hundred
husbands were arrested for wife beating in Boston each year, it seems “odd” that
feminists did not directly address the issue of male family violence. Yet, so
many women of the era were economically dependent on marriage that their
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importance as mothers provided a useful “wedge” against the abrogation of their
right to live free of battery, and feminists' recognition of this allowed them to
focus on other, more traditional political issues. For instance, when feminists
sought Prohibition, the “image of the beaten wife" played a prominent role in the
campaign. According to Gordon, drinking was “a veritable code word for male
violence."”^ By framing the issue of male brutality in terms of temperance,
feminists managed to publicize the problem of wife beating as a consequence of
alcohol abuse, while at the same time successfully defining drunkenness (and its
consequences) as a “male vice."“® Further, the feminist campaign for divorce
enabled women’s rights activists to publicly disclose shocking stories of battered
wives. According to Gordon, feminists of the era actually “sheltered runaway
wives, agitated in particular divorce and child-custody cases, held a few public
meetings on egregious cases of injustice-and used these cases to argue for
women’s right to divorce and to vote.”^®®
Aside from Stone and her loyal suffragist husband Henry Blackwell, most
turn-of-the-century feminists did not include wife beating on their lengthy
“laundry list” of social ills (i.e., child labor, world war, etc.) which the
enfranchisement of women would somehow “cure.” According to Pleck,
penalties for wife beating were too mild, from the view of Stone and Blackwell,
because “women were unable to vote.”“^ Lucy Stone insisted that “the
women’s vote would compel judges to sentence wife beaters to long prison
sentences,” and that battered wives could never be “adequately protected...until
women help make the laws.""” Unfortunately, the enfranchisement of women in
1920 did not reduce the rate of wife beating in America; yet, as Pleck observes,
social reformers and early twentieth century feminists succeeded to a large
extent in encouraging wives “to demand from their husbands better treatment,
greater dignity, and autonomy-a marriage free of violence and brutality and a
union committed to the principles of caring and mutual respect.""”
In England, the turning point in establishing a woman's right not to be
beaten by her husband took place in 1891, when a Court of Appeals handed
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down a decision of considerabie importance for women's rights. In retrospect, it
seems as if the case of R. v. Jackson had the same sort of importance in the
area of family law that Brown v. Board of Education had in civil rights law. In
1932, Justice McCardie said of R. v. Jackson that “from that point, the shackles
of servitude fell from the limbs of married women and they were free to come
and go at their own
The case arose out a husband’s forcible seizure and imprisonment of his
wife, and the appellate court had no choice but to consider the long-held right of
husbands to “physically chastise” their wives, because the “right to imprison” and
the “right to beat” were inextricably intertwined in British common law. The
Jackson court ruled that “the ancient dicta” which granted men a right to beat
their wives must necessarily be rejected, If the right to imprison one’s wife was to
be repealed, since the two were so closely Interrelated in law. “It is Impossible,”
the court opined, “to throw overboard the right to beat and retain the rest of the
proposition with regard to the right to imprison.”^^^
Nonetheless, the dominant society In England retained the view that
chastisement was a husband’s prerogative, and most British judges continued to
grant lenient sentences for violent assaults by husbands against their wives.^^^
In America, Lucy Stone became so discouraged at the failure of her protection
bill to pass, and at the continual pattern of U.S. courts granting lenient
sentences to wife beaters, that she aligned herself politically with legislators who
favored severe punishment for wife beaters Instead of protection for their
innocent wives. When a Massachusetts GOP state legislator sponsored a bill to
punish wife beating with the whipping post. Stone joined the effort to see the
proposal become law.

Most feminists of the early twentieth century viewed

wife beating as a crime, but their primary Interest was In securing the right to a
divorce on grounds of drunkenness or cruelty.
In England, Cobbe’s opposition to flogging wife beaters helped prevent
the enactment of any such legislation, but in the U.S. three states (Maryland,
Delaware, and Oregon) passed laws allowing for the whipping of wife beaters.
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The impact of the new laws was virtually nil, however, and between 1911 and
1917, when the movement to abolish capital punishment was revived,
newspaper editorials denounced the whipping post as "uncivilized.” According
to a state prison warden in Delaware in 1925, any time a whipping actualiy
occurred he received protest letters from across the country denouncing the
punishment. In 1952, Delaware became the last of the three states to abolish
the whipping post.^’®
By the 1920s, in fact, the whipping post was no ionger considered a
viable option for handiing the probiem. A new type of court was established,
with a new approach to the problem of family violence. The new “modem”
approach involved the use of separate tribunals known as “juvenile” courts and
“family” (domestic relations) courts, courts which were aimed at preserving the
family rather than punishing the crime.Hence, a “curative” approach was
attempted, instead of the “punitive” approach which had been in use.
The Progressive era provided the impetus for the new court system, and
the founders of juveniie courts and domestic relations courts brimmed with
optimism. The courts were now allied with the “heiping professions” (i.e.
psychiatry, social work) in order that the family could be preserved.^'®
Progressives sought the preservation of families where the husband was the
primary (if not soie) breadwinner, children attended school full-time, and wives
remained at home, devoting themseives to housework and childrearing.^'® In
his autobiography Back to the Home Judge Bernhard Robbino, the first judge to
preside over New York City’s Court of Domestic Relations, argued that “if
mothers remained at home caring for their chiidren and being supported by their
husbands, they wouid be abie to raise heaithier chiidren and prepare their
children to become responsible citizens,
Robbino insisted that the men and women who came before him at his
family court were not “hardened lawbreakers,” and that “domestic trouble cases
are not criminal in the legal sense.The average couple that appeared In
family court, according to sociological surveys, were white, Protestant, working
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class men and women without a high school diploma.^^^ The wife was generally
a homemaker, the husband was typically a factory worker, and the couple
usually had several children. Physical assault constituted the single most
common reason that a wife brought charges at family court.
Reconciliation, or “home mending,” represented the official policy of
courts of domestic relations. According to Pleck, wife beating was often viewed
as having been caused by “the extravagance of the wife and the arrogance and
lack of understanding on the part of the husband who is abusive in manner.”^^^
A few of the new courts granted divorces, but most sought family reconciliation if
it was at all possible. If not, a legal separation was often granted, accompanied
by a judicial order requiring that a husband pay support.^^®
In deciding whether to order support payments, judges often closely
examined the wife’s (but not the husband’s) morality. Family law court judges
possessed near-absolute discretion over the personal lives of those men and
women who came before them, and virtually every aspect of the parties’
personal lives was examined. One judge declared that if “the woman has not
been living the right kind of life, I will not make an order on the man to support
her.”^^® The court system clearly legitimized the socially prevalent “double
standard,” reflecting the pre-existing social biases in America. In one case cited
by Gordon, a man gave his wife a black eye when he was “a little drunk,” but the
wife was placed in a psychopathic hospital for observation and classified as an
“imbecile" because she displayed the characteristic symptoms of depression and
exhaustion.^^^
Between the turn of the century and the 1970s, wife beating in America
was discussed only rarely; when it was, euphemisms such as “domestic
disturbance” and “family maladjustment” were typically used. A new
understanding of family violence came to the fore within the medical profession,
however, after Freudian psychoanalytical theory led to a new “sexual” way of
viewing the problem.^^® Freud’s ideas "liberated” the scientific world from
previous stodgy, overly moralistic Victorian values, but the new approach
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actually revived misogynistic myths of "the seductive daughter, the nagging wife,
and the lying hysteric.”^^®
The ideas of Freud’s disciple Helene Deutsch created a tremendous impact
on psychiatry and, in turn, prevailing social perceptions of violence against
women.^^ By the 1930s, according to Dobash and Dobash, “psychoanalysis
had enshrined the myth of masochism into its conceptions of normal female
psychology.”^^^ Speculation was presented as if it constituted scientific truth,
with the result that many “experts” believed the seemingly incredible notion that
battered women derived sexual gratification from being battered (!) by their
husbands. Deutsch popularized the term “masochistic’ in her book Psychology
of Women, and the term saw extensive use in the mid-twentieth century. The
psychology of the rape victim, from this view, could be readily understood: she
had an unconscious desire to be raped.^^^ Further, women were actually seen
as causing their husband’s alcoholism through their own “irrational,” inconsistent
behavior. The battered woman became known as the “doormat wife,” a woman
who could not only not understand her own complicity in her beatings, but
actualty permitted the beatings to continue as a means of holding on to her
husband’s,hand in marriage.^^^
Masochism was repeatedly and frequently diagnosed. One
Massachusetts social worker who had been to a client’s home in 1956 wrote:
She did say he was very abusive to her when he was drunk
and it was difficult to ascertain if she derived masochistic pleasure
in the abuse or if she is too limited because of physical difficulties
and emotional difficulties to do anything about the situatlon.^^
Not only were battered women being diagnosed, they were also being
blamed for failing to somehow solve the problem themselves, without any help
from social services. In 1956, in the “eyes of society,” the problem scarcely
seemed to exist; if the subject was broached at all, euphemisms were used.
Like rape, wife beating was considered a “taboo” topic, seldom discussed
publicly except as a “joking matter.”^^® As Elizabeth Fleck has written, the
“rebirth of feminism" led to “the rediscovery of wife beating.””® Linda Gordon, by
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contrast, arguas that “the recent rediscovery of family violence was
accomplished in part by pressure from the victims themselves.As has
consistently been the pattern, the “rediscovery” of the problem of battered
women in America has led to changes in law and society, and the responses by
those In power have largely stemmed from pressure from within the women’s
movement, and from women themselves. Unless the problem of battered women
remains within the public domain, however, public awareness of its occurrence
will eventually decrease, battered women and their friends and families will
refrain from discussing it, and batterers will likely be able to literally “get away
with murder.”

Why Real Men Don’t Hit Women, But Men Really Do

Public / private precepts embody the essence of American society’s
“double standard.” As Del Martin describes the double standard, it comprises a
“virile husband protecting his honor and property” on the one hand, and a
“virginal, loyal wife” remaining dutiful and domestic on the other.Martin
describes an Interesting list of adjectives which U.S. society applies to men and
women, adjectives which she found in certain reference books such as Roget's
Thesaurus, the Bible, and The Psychology of Sex Differences by Maccoby and
Jacklin.^^® Men often begin to feel anxious to demonstrate their masculinity and
their virility at a relatively young age, and a short list of adjectives pertaining to
men is enough to make anyone, male or female, become anxious. Words like
“aggressive, brave, analytical, determined, orderly, rational, bold, stable, selfsufficient, and public" define masculinity.^^ By contrast, terms such as “passive,
modest, delicate, tender, timid, cautious, sympathetic, self-sacrificing, and
private” denote femininity.^^’
The fact that these characteristics are considered “normal” and “natural"
does not explain why some men hit some women. Women and men throughout
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the U.S. receive constant, on-going exposure to these terms all throughout their
lives, and yet not ail men hit women. Exposure to gender-specific socially
constructed terminology serves to increase our understanding of why women
and men might behave differently, but it fails to suffice as a plausible explanation
of why some men hit women, because it fails to account for the vast majority of
cases where men are constantly exposed to such terms but do not become
batterers.
Feminist legal theorist Robin West has advanced two theses which can
help foster our understanding of feminism and male patriarchal jurisprudence.
The “separation thesis” describes men as “separate” sorts of individuals whose
awareness of their separate nature informs their behavior in life. As separate
and unconnected beings, men, according to West, “fear frustration of their
individual ends by other separate individuals.”^^^ As separate and unconnected
beings, men often lead tragic lives, caught between a desire to remain separate
and therefore “masculine” on one hand, and to become actively engaged In their
communities on the other.
West’s “separation thesis” provides a theoretical basis for the practice of
law, according to West, because “law’s most common response to conflict is to
separate, to keep individuals from interfering with each other’s pursuits by
removing them from one another.”^^^ West’s “connection thesis,” by contrast,
describes women as connected with others, and as being afraid of abandonment
and isolation.^^ Radical feminist theory counters this thesis by claiming that
women experience the “violence of forced community,” or of “invasion.”^^®
The two aforementioned theses are problematic because of the ways in
which they overlap between the two socially constructed gender categories. It is
not the case that all men desire to be separate from others as Individuals, and it
is hardly true that all women wish to be connected with society. Further, men not
only desire to become actively engaged in the community, but they traditionally
operate primarily in the public domain in positions of power. Women, on the
other hand, often feel as if they “need their space,” a time which Maya Angelou
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has called “a day away” to regroup and to reconsider themselves within the
context of the rest of society. Yet, as general indicators of men’s and women’s
lived experiences, the aforementioned theses possess a degree of usefulness in
attempting to understand the reasons why men batter women, and why the
traditionally male-oriented legal system treats male offenders in the ways it
does.
During the socialization process, men become channeled into the
category “male,” and they are expected to function in the public sphere as
separate individuals. According to psychologist Peter Wyden, “men are not
programmed to be other than aggressive,” and so “much of the aggressive
hostility vented on women must be seen as a product of our schizoid culture.”^^
This may be true, but it not only fails to account for the majority of men who are
not prone to violence against women, it also allows batterers to blame society’s
“schizoid culture.” U.S. society probably is schizoid, however; the
aforementioned list of male and female adjectives provides sufficient evidence of
that fact.
As mentioned in the “historical” section of this paper, women of the
nineteenth century temperance movement believed that liquor caused male
violence, and so it logically followed that Prohibition would provide the cure.
Today, a similar point of view actually remains prevalent in America. As Martin
writes, “Police and social scientists share widely in the view that many family
disputes involving assaultive behavior can be traced to the use of alcohol by one
or both participants.”^^^ Yet, evidence indicates that only 30 percent of wife
beaters used alcohol at the time they hit their spouse, and only 26 percent of the
women had been Imbibing.^^ Further, alcohol provides another excuse through
which men who commit violence against women can deceive friends and family
with regard to their violent behavior; men who hit women often try to blame
booze, saying things such as “I just wasn’t myself. I would never do anything
like that if I wasn’t drunk.” Contemporary British feminist activist Erin Pizzey
directly refutes the notion that booze causes battery, stating: “Some of the men
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who batter are alcoholics, but stopping them from drinking doesn’t stop the
violence. Anything can release the trigger of violence In a batterer. It can be
alcohol, a child crying, a bad day at the horses.Hence, contrary to popular
opinion, alcohol does not in and of itself directly lead to male violence, and so
alcoholism falls as a valid explanation.
Psychological explanations have often been advanced to explain male
violence. The primary proponents of this perspective have been psychiatrists,
although sociologists and other experts have agreed with this perspective. From
this view, according to family therapist Ron Thorne-Finche, a combination of
factors including “personality disorders, low frustration tolerance, dependency,
developmental trauma, depression, and various psychiatric Illnesses" account
for the actions of violent men.^®° Yet this explanation also falls on at least two
accounts. For one, studies demonstrate that psychiatric disorders constitute an
especially poor indicator of violent behavior, and that psychiatric patients do not
engage in violent behavior more often than the rest of society.Also, at least
one study shows that psychiatric treatment itself not only fails to solve the
problem, but that it may actually exacerbate the problem in at least some cases.
Researchers have attempted to determine the likelihood that
physiological factors cause male violence against women. Evidence does
indicate that certain physiological factors affect human behavior, but such
evidence fails to account for the fact that men are far more likely to be violenceprone than women. Various portions of the human brain have been linked to
aggressive behavior; this, coupled with the fact that men are socialized to be
aggressive as a fundamental part of the essence of “masculinity,” may play a
crucial role in the causation.
Sociobiologists have often cited high testosterone levels as being a
primary cause of male viotence, a claim which helps explain the wide
discrepancy between male and female aggressiveness. The argument that high
testosterone levels cause male violence fails to hold true for a few reasons,
however. For one, testosterone level fluctuate wildly under certain

55

circumstances, and it is not knowiwhether high testosterone levels constitute a
cause or an effect of male violence.^®^ Also, not only is testosterone’s function
influenced by an enormous variety of social variables, but its effects on humans
are not as direct as they are on the laboratory animals which researchers have
used to conduct their experimentation.Hence, the jury is out on the issue of
the physiology of male violence, primarily because physiological factors cannot
readily be studied in conjunction with social factors In order to determine the
degree of interplay between nature and nurture.
As Thorne-Finch writes, we have “yet to fully emerge from our lengthy
legacy of legislated permissibility of male violence.’’^®^ The legal history of
Coverture and its corresponding acceptance of a husband’s right to “chastise”
(batter) his wife still carry crucial ramifications today. Try as we might, we can
never completely emerge from our past. The historical legacy of socially
condoned violence against women has left permanent scars on the social
psyche of western civilization, scars which will slowly heal over the course of
time but which will never fully disappear. A common truism holds that It is
impossible to legislate people’s attitudes, and such is the case with male
violence. It will take a combination of time, coupled with a concerted effort on
the part of men and women alike, to affect positive social change and ameliorate
the problem of men hitting women.
The causes of male violence in America are numerous, and so it is
counterproductive to look at one factor and call it “the” cause of the problem.
Robin West’s separation thesis entails the notion that the social category “man”
constitutes a set of separate, self-sufficient, aggressive individuals, and society
fosters this notion. Surprisingly, images from the popular media proscribe a
rather limited number of roles for male actors, many of which are often violent.
In childhood, males constantly see violently images reinforced on television:
images of men dashing around with loaded guns, protecting helpless women are
part and parcel of any young man’s upbringing.
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Manhood in the United States becomes equated with Sylvester Stalloneas-Rambo, and Arnold Schwarzenegger-as-the-saviour; action-packed scenes
of men aggressively pursuing wicked villains dominate television and the
movies. Because of this constant and insidious exposure to male aggression,
boys come to believe that manhood actually entails being the “strong and
rugged hero.” A frustrated strong and rugged hero becomes the anti-hero, the
batterer.
The notion that male violence is “socially acceptable” becomes engrained
in the male mind quite early in life. In the popular mainstream media, violence is
commonly portrayed as acceptable for the men: “You’ve gotta be a football
hero, to get along with a beautiful gal" is a frequent refrain heard by youngsters
as they are growing up, if not literally, at least figuratively. Watching the Super
Bowl, young males in America learn that “real” men play tough and hard, and
that “real” women dress In skimpy costumes (i.e., the Dallas Cowboy’s
cheerleaders).
Sociologist Robert N. Whitehunt has summed up the cultural dilemma for
men. “Our culture teaches men to be tough and ready to fight if necessary,” he
writes. “To expect men to become tender lovers and responsive husbands
seems to be asking more than logic can allow.”^®^ And logic, of course,
constitutes the cornerstone of liberal masculine patriarchal Ideology. Battered
women support Whitehunt’s claim, describing their husbands in pathological
terms: “Angry, resentful, suspicious, moody, tense, helpless. Inadequate, and
insecure.”^®®
The renowned psychologist Erich Fromm has described the wife-beater
as a desperate, disturbed, sadistic individual. The “more powerless a person is,”
declares Fromm,” the more likely he is to compensate for his weakness by
sadism. He may even risk his life for a moment of absolute power.”^®^ The
American double standard informs the American marital standard, and, as Del
Martin writes, if a wife-beater “does not risk his life when he beats his wife, at
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least he sacrifices his sense of right and wrong for the feeling of power he
derives from harming someone weaker than himself.
Feminists have successfully challenged the view that women are
“naturally” perfect mates for men, and so today many U.S. women have rejected
the all-American marriage culture and its inherently unjust double standard. In
her famous book Against Our Will, Susan Brownmiller argued that “female fear of
an open season on rape, and not a natural inclination toward monogamy,
motherhood, and love, was probably the single causative factor in the original
subjugation of woman by man, the most important key to her historic
dependence.”^“ The duality of the “male protector / female dependent” must be
deconstructed in its entirety if the single most Important question ever raised
with regard to the essence of man’s humanity is ever to be answered: “Can the
wife-beater come to understand that he risks his very humanness for a moment
of false power?”^®®
Real men need not assume any such risks. Real women need real
political and social empowerment, something which only real men can step aside
and allow them to achieve.
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